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11 Introduction
In economic models, the analyst often focuses on interior allocations and sel-
dom realizes how irrealistic it is. In real life, ordinary individuals consume
only a tiny fraction of the available commodities. Moreover, the available
commodities in an integrated economic space represent only a fraction of
the whole set of conceivable or simply producible commodities. As a conse-
quence, very little is known about preferences over unavailable commodities.
Japanese preferences over the various kinds of sheep cheese from diﬀerent
valleys in the French Pyrenees are hardly known, just like French preferences
over varieties of sake are diﬃcult to guess. Modern preferences over the use
of pigeon post are unknown, just like 17th century preferences over cellular
phones.
This is the source of well-known problems in international comparisons
of living standards. The fact that diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent consump-
tion goods in their national markets makes it diﬃcult to compare prices, and
the computation of purchasing power parities has to rely on gross approxi-
mations. For instance, the few items that are common in two countries are
used to compute indexes of relative prices for broad categories of goods. A
similar problem occurs in time series for the evaluation of growth over many
periods of time. Moreover, in order to evaluate the true living standards, one
should presumably take account of individuals’ preferences. Even if the usual
computations of real incomes in purchasing power parity units are useful, the
relation between such evaluations and true population preferences is rather
loose.
Given the constraints of available commodities, it seems inevitable to
focus only on individuals’ preferences over available commodities in social
welfare evaluations of resource allocations, and to disregard those over un-
available ones. It is simply impossible to take account of commodities we
do not know, for instance those which are yet to be invented. Furthermore,
one may argue that even in the case of known but unavailable commodities,
it makes little sense to take account of individuals’ preferences over them in
order to allocate available commodities. The welfare evaluation of Japanese
consumption may ignore apple fritters, just like the evaluation of French
consumption may ignore fugu.
In this paper, we examine the possibility of making social welfare evalu-
ations on the sole basis of individuals’ preferences over available commodi-
ties. More precisely, we introduce a condition of Independence of Irrelevant
2Commodities (IIC), stating that when two allocations have zero quantities
of some commodities, the social ranking of these two allocations should be
independent of individuals’ preferences over these commodities. Our frame-
work follows the theory of social choice in economic environments, surveyed,
for instance, by Le Breton (1997) and Le Breton and Weymark (2000).
IIC is similar to the well-known condition due to Arrow (1951), Indepen-
dence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), but it turns out to be much weaker
and, we believe, much less controversial. Let us brieﬂy explain why. IIA
states that the ranking of two allocations should depend only on individuals’
preferences over these two allocations. This requirement is often implausible,
especially in economic environments. For instance, suppose that half of the
population prefers allocation x and half of the population prefers allocation
y. How can we rank x and y with this limited information? Under IIA, we
may not explore whether any one of these allocations is Pareto-eﬃcient (with
respect to the total quantity distributed in this allocation), envy-free, or a
Walrasian equilibrium with equal budgets because such exploration requires
checking how bundles in x or y a r er a n k e di ni n d i v i d u a lp r e f e r e n c e sw i t h
respect to other bundles. IIA forbids the use of information about individual
preferences that is considered directly relevant to the welfare or fairness eval-
uation of allocations in standard economic analyses.1 In contrast, IIC allows
us to use all the information about individuals’ preferences over available
commodities. This information encompasses that retained in IIA, namely,
how individuals rank x and y, and extends much more. In particular, the
i n f o r m a t i o nr e t a i n e di nI I Ci ss u ﬃcient to assess whether any of these allo-
c a t i o n si sP a r e t o - e ﬃcient, envy-free, or a Walrasian equilibrium with equal
budgets.
We may even claim that our condition is actually more faithful to Arrow’s
initial vision. As a defense of his condition for applications to the evaluation
of resource allocations, Arrow wrote (1950, p. 346; see also 1951, p. 73):
‘Suppose that there are just two commodities, bread and wine.
A distribution, deemed equitable by all, is arranged, with the
wine-lovers getting more wine and less bread than the abstainers.
Suppose now that all the wine is destroyed. Are the wine-lovers
entitled, because of that fact, to more than an equal share of
1For a more detailed criticism of Arrow’s condition in economic contexts, see e.g.
Mayston (1974), Pazner (1979), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996, 2005), Fleurbaey, Suzu-
mura and Tadenuma (2005a,b).
3bread? The answer is, of course, a value judgment. My own
feeling is that tastes for unattainable alternatives should have
nothing to do with the decision among the attainable ones; desires
in conﬂict with reality are not entitled to consideration.’
This example suggests that when wine is not available, preferences over
wine should be disregarded. This is exactly what our IIC states. Arrow’s IIA
says much more than this, requiring that the ranking of any two allocations
should depend only on how people rank these two allocations. Besides, Ar-
row’s mention of “equal shares” is in fact an introduction of fairness consider-
ations which cannot be accommodated within the informational straitjacket
of Arrow’s condition.
We do not consider Arrow’s impossibility theorem to be a serious obstacle
to social choice in economic environments because IIA imposes a too severe
restriction on information about individuals’ preferences. Unfortunately, as
we show, our condition still entails a similar impossibility result even though
it is much weaker than IIA. Combined with a Pareto condition embodying
the respect for unanimous individuals’ preferences, it implies that the social
preference rule must be dictatorial: social preferences must always obey one
particular agent’s strict preferences. We consider this result to be much more
disturbing than Arrow’s theorem.
More precisely, however, we show that the whole domain of possible pop-
ulation preferences is partitioned into two subdomains, and the dictatorship
result holds on one of these subdomains, whereas a non-dictatorial rule can
be constructed on the complementary subdomain. The latter subdomain of
possibility, in fact, contains population preferences which are quite unlikely
for preferences about ordinary commodities. Indeed, we obtain nice social
preferences only for particular allocations and preference proﬁles such that
every commodity is “indispensable” for at least one individual, in the sense
that if this commodity were unavailable, then this individual would be worse
oﬀ than at these allocations. For ordinary commodities, with their innumer-
able varieties, this seems far-fetched. We argue that this conﬁguration is
however reasonable if the objects of individual preferences are not ordinary
commodities but composite commodities, “characteristics” (Lancaster, 1971)
or human “functionings” (Sen, 1985). In our view, thus, our results advo-
cate that social evaluations should be made with respect to characteristics
or functionings rather than ordinary commodities.
Our work is related to the small part of the social choice literature which
4has been critical of Arrow’s independence condition and has examined how
to construct fair social preferences when this condition is relaxed. Mayston
(1974, 1982), Pazner (1979), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1986), Fleurbaey,
Suzumura and Tadenuma (2005a,b) studied how to rely on individual indif-
ference surfaces in order to construct “fair” social preferences. In this litera-
ture, the main independence condition, among the less restrictive, allows us
to use information about the whole indiﬀerence surface of every individual
at contemplated allocations in order to rank the allocations. As shown by
these authors, nice social preference rules can be constructed under this in-
dependence condition. Our IIC is neither weaker nor stronger than this. It
allows us to retain information about the whole preference maps in the sub-
space of consumed commodities while discarding the rest of the indiﬀerence
surfaces. More closely related to our condition of independence is Donaldson
and Roemer’s (1987) consistency condition, which essentially requires social
evaluation to disregard commodities with identical quantities in the alloca-
tions to be compared. They also derive an impossibility theorem, but their
framework is diﬀerent since it involves utility functions, whereas we consider
only ordinal non-comparable preferences. Moreover, their consistency con-
dition is somehow stronger than ours. We only require social evaluation to
disregard individual preferences over commodities with zero quantities, but
require nothing concerning commodities with identical positive quantities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
parable conveying the main intuition for our results. Sections 3 and 4 intro-
duce the formal framework and the main notions. Section 5 states and proves
the main result. Section 6 introduces a stronger variant of the independence
condition. Section 7 examines the prospects for possibility results in light of
the results.
2 A tale of two commodities
With a simple example, this section shows why it may entail a diﬃculty
to require social evaluations to disregard individual preferences about un-
available commodities. On Robinson and Friday’s island, two commodities
may be available, bread and wine. Assume that both Robinson and Fri-
day have strictly monotonic and self-centered preferences, so that when only
one commodity is available, there is no question about their preferences over
various allocations of this commodity. If we want to evaluate allocations
5made of one commodity only, and disregard individuals’ preferences for the
other commodity, then such social evaluation may be made irrespectively of
individuals’ preferences altogether.
Suppose that we consider allocation x better than allocation y,when these
allocations are as described in the following table, along two other allocations
z and w.
Robinson Friday
bread wine bread wine
x 8 0 5 0
y 10 0 1 0
z 0 8 0 5
w 0 10 0 1
As explained above, the evaluation of x and y should be valid indepen-
dently of individuals’ preferences for wine. Then it can be argued that alloca-
tion z should also be considered better than allocation w, also independently
of individual preferences. Indeed, suppose that Robinson’s and Friday’s pref-






One sees that both individuals prefer z to x and y to w. This strongly
suggests that z is better than x and y is better than w. But since x is better
than y, by transitivity one concludes that z is better than w. Of course, this
reasoning was made with particular individual preferences and by compar-
isons of allocations containing bread (x and y) to allocations containing wine
(z and w), but since z and w contain only wine, this particular judgment
about these two allocations should be upheld independently of individual
preferences over bread.
By a similar construction, one can show that whenever an allocation
containing only one commodity is better for Friday, it should be declared
better if we want social evaluations to be consistent with the initial judgment
that x is better than y. In other words, Friday is what social choice theory
6calls a dictator over such one-commodity allocations: whenever he prefers an
allocation to another, the social evaluation obeys.2
Now, consider any pair of two-commodity allocations a and b. Suppose,
for instance, that Friday prefers a to b.I fR o b i n s o np r e f e r sa to b as well, one
concludes from the Pareto principle that a is better than b. What if Robinson
prefers b? Suppose that there is a pair of bread-only allocations, x0 and y0,






Then, by the same reasoning as above, one can conclude that a is better.
It seems that Friday is dictator for all allocations, including two-commodity
allocations.
This conclusion, however, would be hasty. Suppose that Robinson prefers
the bundle made of 1 unit of bread and 1 unit of wine to any one-commodity
bundle. If b were better than this (1,1) bundle for him, it would be impos-
sible to ﬁnd a bread-only allocation y0 better than b for him, and the above
reasoning would fail. It is then indeed possible to rank b above a, against
Friday’s preference. Friday’s dictatorship need not extend to all allocations.
This simple example has provided some intuition for the main elements
of our analysis: 1) the condition of Independence of Irrelevant Commodities
may still entail a dictatorship result; 2) impartial social evaluation is however
possible in some cases; 3) a key fact is whether individuals, according to their
own preferences, can ﬁnd better bundles containing less commodities.
3S u ﬃcient and dispensable commodities
Let L := {1,...,`} be the set of commodities,a n dN := {1,...,n} the set
of agents,w h e r e2 ≤ `<∞ and 2 ≤ n<∞.D e n o t i n g R+ the set of all
2Interestingly, with an iteration of this kind of argument, one can show that dictator-
ship over one-commodity allocations can even be obtained when one restricts individual
preferences to be quasi-linear with respect to one given commodity. This line of analysis
therefore appears robust to severe domain restrictions, but we will not explore this issue
further in this paper.
7non-negative real numbers, RL
+ is the set of all consumption bundles. Agent
i’s consumption bundle is a vector xi := (xi1,...,x i`) ∈ RL
+.A nallocation is a
vector x := (x1,...,xn) ∈ (RL
+)n.T h es e to fa l la l l o c a t i o n sis (RL
+)n.T h es e t
of allocations such that no individual bundle xi is equal to the zero vector is





In order to study allocations in which some of the ` commodities are






+ := {xi ∈ R
L
+ | ∀k ∈ L\K, xik =0 }.
Notice that RK
+ is a subset of RL
+, so that xi ∈ RK
+ is a full vector with `
components, some of which are simply null.
An ordering is a reﬂexive and transitive binary relation. For each i ∈ N,
agent i’s preference relation is a complete ordering Ri on RL
+, that is, on
i’s personal bundles. This means that, as is standard in microeconomics,
we restrict attention to self-centered preferences. The strict preference re-
lation and the indiﬀerence relation associated to Ri are denoted Pi and Ii,
respectively. Let R be the set of continuous, convex, and strictly3 monotonic
preference relations.
We now introduce some notions which will play a key role in our analysis.
Consider an arbitrary subset K of commodities, and some agent’s preference
relation Ri. For this preference relation, we may ask whether satisfaction
is bounded or unbounded with bundles containing only those commodities,
that is, with bundles xi ∈ RK
+. The expression “bounded satisfaction” here
does not refer to a utility representation of preferences. In our terminology,
satisfaction is bounded in RK
+ when there are some indiﬀerence surfaces which
cannot be reached with bundles in RK
+. Satisfaction is unbounded when any
arbitrary indiﬀerence surface can be reached with bundles in RK
+.N o w , i f
satisfaction is unbounded in RK
+, we will call K a suﬃcient set. Otherwise,
it may be called an insuﬃcient set. For instance, with only water, bread
and lodging in log cabins, satisfaction may be bounded, so that this set of
three commodities is insuﬃcient. On the contrary, with all the commodities
typically available in a given country, one can reach any indiﬀerence surface,
so that this forms a suﬃcient set.
3For a discussion of the role of strict monotonicity in our analysis, see a remark in the
appendix.
8When K is a suﬃcient set, we will say that the complement set M = L\K
is a dispensable set. Indeed, this means that satisfaction is unbounded in ab-
sence of the commodities in M. Conversely, when satisfaction is bounded in
absence of commodities in M, M will be called an indispensable set.F o r
instance, apple fritters and fugu may be dispensable for some preferences,
whereas water and newspapers may be indispensable for these same prefer-
ences. The following table summarizes these notions.
Satisfaction is bounded Satisfaction is unbounded
With K insuﬃcient suﬃcient
Without K indispensable dispensable






+,y i Ri xi.





+,x i Pi yi.
K is a dispensable set for Ri if L \ K is a suﬃcient set, and K is an indis-
pensable set for Ri if L \ K is an insuﬃcient set.
If K is suﬃcient (resp., indispensable) for Ri, then any K0 ⊇ K is also
suﬃcient (resp., indispensable) for Ri. If K is insuﬃcient (resp., dispensable)
for Ri, then any K0 ⊆ K is also insuﬃcient (resp., dispensable) for Ri. The
set L is always suﬃcient and indispensable. Notice that the complement of
as u ﬃcient (resp., dispensable) set need not be insuﬃcient (resp., indispens-
able). For instance, with all the typical Japanese commodities, one can reach
any indiﬀerence surface, while at the same time, one can do so with all the
typical French commodities.
4 Social ordering functions
Any evaluation of public policy, or any comparison of social welfare in various
times or regions requires some comparisons between diﬀerent social states.
Here the social state is described in terms of allocations of commodities.
Hence, we need a well-deﬁned rule to socially rank allocations based on in-
dividuals’ preferences. In other words, we look for a social ordering function
9which associates to each proﬁle of individuals’ preferences a consistent rank-
ing of allocations.
A proﬁle of preference relations is a list RN := (R1,...,Rn) ∈ Rn. A social
ordering function (SOF) is a mapping Ψ deﬁn e do ns o m es e tD ⊆ Rn, such
that for all RN ∈ D, Ψ(RN) is a complete ordering on the set of all allocations
(RL
+)n. Ψ(RN) is interpreted as the social ordering of all allocations when
agents’ preferences are RN.W es i m p l yd e n o t eb yR (with no subscript) the
social ordering Ψ(RN),b yR0 the social ordering Ψ(R0
N),a n ds oo n ,w h e nn o
confusion may arise.
We will repeatedly require the SOF to obey the Weak Pareto condition
saying that unanimous strict preference must be respected. This is a very
basic condition of respect of individual preferences. It is especially compelling
when dealing, as here, with self-centered preferences. It then means that
individuals are sovereign over their personal consumption.
Weak Pareto: ∀RN ∈ D, ∀x,y ∈ (RL
+)n, if ∀i ∈ N,xi Pi yi, then xPy .
We also need to deﬁne the notion of dictatorship. Let Y be a subset of
(RL
+)n. We say that an agent i0 ∈ N is a dictator for the SOF Ψ over Y if for
all RN ∈ D, all x,y ∈ Y, xi0 Pi0 yi0 implies xPy .The SOF Ψ is dictatorial
over Y i ft h e r ei sad i c t a t o rf o rΨ over Y.
L e tu sr e c a l lA r r o w ’ st h e o r e mf o rt h i sm o d e l . I ti n v o l v e sA r r o w ’ si n d e -
pendence condition, requiring that for any given pair of allocations, a change
of individuals’ preferences about a third allocation should not alter the social
ranking between the given two allocations.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: ∀RN,R 0
N ∈ D, ∀x,y ∈ (RL
+)n,
if ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y},t h e nR and R0 agree on {x,y}.
On the economic domain studied here, the following version of Arrow’s
theorem was established by Bordes and Le Breton (1989).
Theorem 1 On the domain Rn,i faS O Fs a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto and Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Alternatives, then it is dictatorial over X.
The whole domain Rn may be partitioned in two subdomains D+ and D−.
The former is the subset of proﬁles such that every proper subset K ⊆ L
is insuﬃcient (and therefore every non-empty subset is indispensable) for at
least one agent i ∈ N, and the latter is the complement, that is, it is the
subset of proﬁles such that there is a proper subset K ⊆ L that is suﬃcient
(and its non-empty complement is dispensable) for all i ∈ N. Intuitively,
10D+ is the set of proﬁles such that the absence of any commodity in the
economy makes some agent’s satisfaction bounded. In contrast, for proﬁles
in D−, there is always some subset of commodities which can be absent in
the allocations without limiting any agent’s satisfaction as long as enough
quantities of commodities in its complement are available.
Formally:
D
+ = {RN ∈ R
n | ∀K ⊆ L,K 6= L,∃i ∈ N, K is insuﬃcient for Ri}
= {RN ∈ R





= {RN ∈ R
n | ∃K ⊆ L,K 6= L,∀i ∈ N, K is suﬃcient for Ri}
= {RN ∈ R
n | ∃K ⊆ L,K 6= ∅,∀i ∈ N, K is dispensable for Ri}.
How relevant are the two cases epitomized by these two subdomains? If
one thinks of applications in intertemporal or international studies of stan-
dards of living, certainly the D− case is more relevant. Among the millions
of diﬀerent kinds of consumption goods and services available in the world
economy, many of them could be dispensed with, and this would not signif-
icantly reduce the prospects for human development and satisfaction. On
the other hand, in simple models where a limited number of commodities
represent important dimensions of individual achievements, then D+ is the
relevant domain to consider, because thriving is presumably impossible in
absence of any of the considered dimensions.
5 Independence of Irrelevant Commodities
As explained in the introduction, we require the social ranking of two allo-
cations to depend only on individual preferences for commodities that are
available in these allocations. The motivation is that individual preferences
for unavailable commodities are not only hard to observe, but also irrelevant,
as illustrated in Arrow’s bread-and-wine example. Formally, our condition
states that a change of individual preferences for unavailable commodities
should not alter the social ranking.
Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIC): ∀RN,R 0
N ∈ D, ∀x,y ∈
(RL
+)n, if ∃K ⊆ L such that x,y ∈ (RK
+)n and ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on
RK
+,t h e nR and R0 agree on {x,y}.
11Our condition is logically weaker than Arrow’s IIA. If a SOF satisﬁes IIA,
it must also satisfy IIC since when individual preferences remain the same
on RK
+, they must remain the same on any pair x,y ∈ (RK
+)n. On the other
hand, many SOFs satisfying IIC do not satisfy IIA whenever the ranking of
any two allocations x,y ∈ (RK
+)n depends on preferences for a third alloca-
tion z ∈ (RK
+)n. Contrary to Arrow’s condition, our independence condition
makes it possible for the SOF to rely on all the information about preferences
that is considered relevant in welfare economics, especially in the theory of
fair allocation. Indeed, when Ri and R0
i agree on RK
+ for all i ∈ N,t h e
status of any allocation x ∈ (RK
+)n does not change with respect to such
criteria as Pareto-eﬃciency,4 envy-freeness,5 minimal equality,6 egalitarian-
equivalence,7 Walrasian equality.8 The criticism that Arrow’s condition ex-
cludes ethically relevant and important information would not apply to our
condition.
Our main result is that, with our independence condition, Arrow’s impos-
sibility carries over to one of the two subdomains distinguished above, but
not to the other. This implies in particular that the impossibility does not
hold any more on the whole domain Rn.
Theorem 2 On the domain D−,i faS O Fs a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto and In-
dependence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it is dictatorial over X. On the
domain D+, there exists a non-dictatorial SOF satisfying Weak Pareto and
Independence of Irrelevant Commodities.
The proof is in the appendix. It is worth noting that the proof of the pos-
sibility result involves an example of a SOF that is not only non-dictatorial,
but actually has nice fairness properties on some important subset of allo-
cations. On this subset, it corresponds to a variant of the SOF introduced
in Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and Pazner (1979), based on the notion
4An allocation x is Pareto-eﬃcient when there is no other allocation y such that P
i∈N yi ≤
P
i∈N xi, yi Ri xi for all i ∈ N, and yi Pi xi for some i ∈ N.
5An allocation x is envy-free (Foley 1967, Kolm 1972) when xi Ri xj for all i,j ∈ N.





all i ∈ N.
7An allocation x is egalitarian-equivalent (Pazner and Schmeidler 1978) if there exists
a bundle x0, proportional to
P
i∈N xi, such that xi Ii x0 for all i ∈ N.
8An allocation is egalitarian Walrasian when there exist p ∈ RL
++ and α ∈ R++ such
that for all i ∈ N, p.xi = α and xi Ri yi for all yi such that p.yi ≤ α.
12of egalitarian-equivalence. Given a reference bundle x0 ∈ RL
++, the SOF is
deﬁn e do nt h i ss u b s e tb y :xRyif and only
min
i
min{λ ∈ R+ | λx0 Ri xi} ≥ min
i
min{λ ∈ R+ | λx0 Ri yi}.
Intuitively, this amounts to evaluating individual situations by the minimal
fraction of x0 which individuals would be willing to substitute for xi, and
applying the maximin criterion to the vector of such individual measures.
The domain D− is rather wide and contains preference proﬁles which may
appear unrealistic (the same criticism could a fortiori be raised against Rn).
In particular it contains preferences proﬁles for which one commodity alone
is suﬃcient. But from the argument in the proof of the impossibility part
of the above theorem (see Lemma 1 in the appendix), one can see that the
dictatorship result still holds if one restricts attention to the subdomain DKK0
related to some ﬁxed subsets of commodities K and K0 with K ∩ K0 = ∅,
and containing all proﬁles RN such that for all i ∈ N, K and K0 are each
suﬃcient for Ri and no proper subset of K or K0 is itself suﬃcient. Think of
K and K0 as two rich sets of commodities all providing all the usual resources
for a ﬂourishing life. Therefore the above result does not depend upon the
consideration of unrealistic cases.
6 An individualistic condition
In this section, we examine the idea of applying the independence principle
to each individual separately. When two allocations give a zero quantity of
some commodity to an individual, one could argue that there is no reason to
take account of his preferences for this commodity in the social ranking of
these two allocations. This may seem particularly suitable for international
studies when diﬀerent populations consume diﬀerent subsets of commodities.
For instance, the evaluation of global allocations of resources might ignore
Japanese preferences about apple fritters when the Japanese do not consume
any, and French preferences about fugu for the same reason.
The “individualistic” version of Independence of Irrelevant Commodities
requires the SOF to disregard agent i’s preferences over non-consumed com-
modities.
Individualistic Independence of Irrelevant Commodities (IIIC):
∀RN,R 0








i agree on R
Ki
+ ,t h e nR and R0 agree on {x,y}.
13This independence condition is logically stronger than the original version
introduced in Section 5 and with it, dictatorship extends to a larger domain.
Formally, we deﬁne the new domain of preference proﬁles as follows.
D
−∗ = {RN ∈ R
n | ∀i ∈ N,∃K ⊆ L,K 6= L, K is suﬃcient for Ri}.
Notice that D− ⊆ D−∗. By allowing heterogeneity of suﬃcient subsets across
individuals, we do not bar the former homogeneous conﬁguration. The com-
plement of this domain is deﬁned as
D
+∗ = {RN ∈ R
n | ∃i ∈ N,∀K ⊆ L,K 6= L, K is insuﬃcient for Ri},
and obviously, D+∗ ⊆ D+.
Theorem 3 On the domain D−∗,i faS O Fs a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto and In-
dividualistic Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it is dictatorial
over X. On the domain D+∗, there exists a non-dictatorial SOF satisfying
Weak Pareto and Individualistic Independence of Irrelevant Commodities.
Individualistic Independence of Irrelevant Commodities might be criti-
cized for being too individualistic and too demanding. In the reference to
international studies above we referred to diﬀerent communities (countries),
not to diﬀerent individuals. This is not a trivial diﬀerence. One may ar-
gue that Japanese preferences over goods which are not available in Japan
do not matter, but if a particular individual in Japan does not consume
sodas, which are available in the local market, this tells something about
h e rp r e f e r e n c e sa b o u ts o d a s ,a n di tm a yb er e l e v a n tt ot a k ea c c o u n to fs u c h
preferences in general. It would, however, be a little cumbersome to formu-
late the “community” version of the independence condition in our model,
and the results would be essentially similar (with impossibility obtained on
a domain in between D− and D−∗).
Another remark must be made, however. Independence of Irrelevant
Commodities has been contrasted with Independence of Irrelevant Alter-
natives, in Section 5, by noticing that the former, contrary to the latter,
does make it possible to refer to eﬃciency and fairness properties of allo-
cations. On this issue, however, Individualistic Independence of Irrelevant
C o m m o d i t i e si ss i m i l a rt oA r r o w ’ sc o n d i t i o n . C o n s i d e rt w oa l l o c a t i o n si n
which Robinson consumes bread only and Friday consumes wine only. In
virtue of Individualistic Independence, their preferences over the commodity
14consumed by the other must be disregarded, making it impossible to assess
eﬃciency and fairness of either allocation. This would also be true for the
community version of the axiom. After all, the world allocation might be
very ineﬃcient simply because the Japanese life-style would suit the French
better, and conversely. In order to check this fact, preferences over the other
community’s consumptions must be examined, even if they are quite hard
to elicit. This observation leads us to conclude that the impossibility results
obtained with the individualistic or community version of Independence of
Irrelevant Commodities have less importance from truly normative consider-
ations, but rather they reveal practical diﬃculties in making social rankings
of global allocations under informational constraints in real life.
7 Absent commodities
The possibility parts of Theorems 2 and 3 give a special role to allocations
in which every commodity is consumed by at least one agent (Th. 2) or even
in which all commodities are consumed by at least one agent (Th. 3). But
the examples remain dictatorial for the other allocations. In this section, we
show that the scope of dictatorship extends to the whole domain of preference
proﬁles with IIC when one focuses on allocations in which some commodities
are absent (and, as above, no agent has the null bundle). Similarly, with
Individualistic IIC, dictatorship prevails in allocations such that no agent
consumes all commodities.
Let X be the subset of X such that at least one commodity is absent
from the allocation, i.e.
X =
(
x ∈ X |
X
i∈N





Theorem 4 On the domain Rn, if a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it is dictatorial on X.









15Theorem 5 On the domain Rn, if a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Indi-
vidualistic Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it is dictatorial on
X.
It may be worth emphasizing that even if X Ã X Ã X, X and X are
large subsets of X that are quite relevant to real life. For instance, let us
consider allocations in one particular country. Commodities produced in
some other regions in the world are often unavailable in this country. In this
context, X contains all relevant allocations. If we consider global allocations
of resources, for the same reason X is a suitable set to consider. Similarly,
when we examine growth paths, the consumption bundles available in the
21th century do not include the commodities that are to be invented in
the future, nor many commodities that were in substantial use in the 17th
century, making X or X the relevant set of allocations depending on whether
we consider allocations at given times or the whole growth paths.
8 W h a ti sl e f tf o rp o s s i b i l i t y ?
We consider that our results seriously challenge the possibility of making rea-
sonable social evaluations of allocations on the basis of ordinary commodities,
in contexts where individuals do not consume all commodities, and/or there
are some disjoint subsets of commodities that may each be suﬃcient for in-
dividuals to attain any level of satisfaction (i.e., any indiﬀerence surface).
One may think of the following easy escape. If we consider a small num-
ber of composite commodities such as food, lodging, transportation, etc.,
then every individual usually consumes some positive amount of every com-
modity. In such a case, our conditions of independence have no bite and
the construction of appealing SOFs is then possible. This solution, however,
has two weaknesses. First, it is rare that composite commodities can be
deﬁned in a way that makes it possible to deﬁne individuals’ preferences con-
sistently. One must assume either that prices are ﬁxed over all contemplated
allocations, or that preferences are separable. Second, restricting attention
to interior allocations (i.e. x À 0)i sa r t i ﬁcial when non-interior allocations
are also obviously feasible. An important fact observed about composite
commodities is not that typical individuals consume positive quantities of
each of them, but that individuals’ reasonable preferences regard each of
them as indispensable. What we should seek is a natural restriction on the
16domain of preference proﬁles which leads to a possibility of reasonable social
evaluations, rather than an artiﬁcial reduction of the set of allocations.
Such favorable conﬁgurations of preferences are hard to obtain with or-
dinary commodities but may be more likely with diﬀerent objects of prefer-
ences, such as characteristics (Lancaster, 1971) or functionings (Sen, 1985).
If that is true, the main conclusion emerging from this analysis is that wel-
fare economics should migrate from the space of commodities to the space of
characteristics or to the space of functionings.
The space of functionings may actually, in all generality, be as diverse
as the space of commodities. For instance, Sen (1992) deﬁnes a functioning
as any kind of achievement attained by the individual. Our negative results
can then be reproduced in the space of functionings if many disjoint sub-
sets of functionings can be suﬃcient for individuals’ preferences. One can
live well without ever performing tightrope walking above the Thames, or
without ever extending Arrow’s theorem. But if we consider broadly cat-
egorized, important functionings, then it is more likely that each of them
becomes indispensable. Moreover, there is enough homogeneity in human
beings to provide means for easy measurement and interpersonal compari-
son of achievement levels in these functionings. For instance, measures of
comparisons are available for literacy and education level, nutritional intake,
health, etc. whereas it is much harder to think of measuring such composite
commodities as educational resources or food.
Similar observations may be made about characteristics. The list of char-
acteristics is virtually endless, and diﬀerent commodities may provide similar
characteristics in some dimensions but quite diﬀerent characteristics in other
dimensions. A particular Japanese meal may provide the same calorie, fat
and protein quantities as a particular French meal, but who would deny that
they provide quite diﬀerent characteristics in some other dimensions? How-
ever, one may hope that there are indispensable, essential characteristics
so that the scope of impossibility is substantially reduced if one considers
characteristics rather than ordinary commodities.
As an example of the above observations, consider again Robinson and
Friday, confronted with three functionings: nutrition, singing and hiking.
Suppose that both Robinson and Friday need nutrition for survival, and
hence {nutrition} is indispensable. However, each of them cannot lead an
enjoyable life without some kind of recreation. Thus, {nutrition} is insuﬃ-
cient, but {nutrition,singing} as well as {nutrition,hiking} is suﬃcient (and
hence {hiking} and {singing} are each dispensable for everyone). We restrict
17attention to allocations in which the total quantity of nutrition is always
positive, and the total quantity of either singing or hiking is also positive.
Consider the following allocations, similar to those of Section 2.
Robinson Friday
nutrition singing hiking nutrition singing hiking
x 8 8 0 5 5 0
y 10 10 0 1 1 0
z 8 0 8 5 0 5
w 10 0 10 1 0 1
Suppose that x is better than y. Then, by a similar argument as in Section
2, one can show that Weak Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Commodi-
ties imply that z is better than w. Friday is then shown to be a dictator over
two-functioning allocations (one of the functionings being nutrition). And,
since {nutrition,singing} and {nutrition,hiking} are suﬃcient for everyone,
the argument can be extended to show that Friday is a dictator over three-
functioning allocations as well.
Dictatorship is avoided only if there is no functioning that is dispens-
able for everyone. Let us now recategorize functionings so that {recreation}
includes both {singing} and {hiking}. Then, not only {nutrition} but also
{recreation} is indispensable for Robinson and Friday because without any
recreation, they cannot reach high levels of indiﬀerence surfaces. We can then
ﬁnd a non-dictatorial SOF, and the reader is referred to the proof of Theorem
2 (the possibility part) for an example. A favorable conﬁguration of this sort
is more likely to be obtained as functionings are more broadly categorized.
A similar observation can be made regarding Individualistic Independence
of Irrelevant Commodities, for which the possibility domain requires at least
one individual for whom every dimension is indispensable.
To summarize, a restricted class of preference proﬁles which leads to a
possibility of reasonable social evaluations can be more naturally obtained if
the objects of preferences are characteristics or functionings that are deﬁned
(and measured) in suﬃciently broad terms. A similar conclusion may be
derived from the consideration of composite commodities, but it is indeed
hoped that one can make suitable categorization in a more satisfactory way
with functionings (or characteristics) than with commodities.
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Appendix: Proofs
In the proofs, some additional notations are needed. For any Ri ∈ R and
any xi ∈ RL





+ | yi Ri xi
ª
.
For any xi ∈ RL





+ | ∃α ∈ R+,y i = αxi
ª
.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :The proof of the ﬁrst part relies on Arrow’s theorem,
and we need to deﬁne a variant of Arrow’s independence condition.
Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: ∀RN,R 0
N ∈ D, ∀x,y ∈
X, if ∀i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y},a n df o rn oi, xi Ii yi, then R and R0
agree on {x,y}.
Lemma 1 On the domain D−, if a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Inde-
pendence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satisﬁes Weak Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.
Proof of Lemma 1. For any RN, let M(RN) be the set of non-empty
subsets of commodities which are dispensable for all agents:
M(RN)={K ⊆ L | K 6= ∅ and ∀i ∈ N, K is dispensable for Ri}.
By deﬁnition of D−, for all RN ∈ D−, M(RN) is not empty. Let RN,R 0
N ∈
D− and x,y ∈ X be such that for all i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y},a n d
for no i ∈ N, xi Ii yi. Assume that xPy .
First case: M(RN)∩M(R0
N) 6= ∅. Choose any M ∈ M(RN) ∩M(R0
N)
and let K := L\M.S i n c ex,y > 0,9 by monotonicity of preferences we know
9Vector inequalities are denoted À,>,≥.
20that yi Pi 0 and xi P0
i 0 for all i. Since M is dispensable for all i in RN and
R0
N,w ec a nc h o o s ez,w,z0,w 0 ∈ (RK
+ \{ 0})n such that for all i ∈ N,
(i) if xi Pi yi (and hence xi P0







(ii) if yi Pi xi (and hence yi P0







(iii) there is λi,λ
0





By Weak Pareto, we have zPxand yPw . By transitivity of P, zPw .
It also follows from Weak Pareto that xP 0 z0 and w0 P0 y.
Next, choose a,b,a0,b 0,a 00,b 00 ∈ (RM
+ \{ 0})n such that for all i ∈ N,
(i) if xi Pi yi,t h e na0
i >a 00
i >a i >b i >b 00
i >b 0
i,a n d




i >a i.a n d
(iii) there is µi,µ 0




For every i ∈ N, c h o o s et w oi n c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o n sγi,γ0
i : R+ → R+ such
that γi(0) = γ0
i(0) = 0, γi(1) = γ0





functions always exist because λi > 1 ⇔ µi > 1 and λ
0
i > 1 ⇔ µ0
i > 1.
Let R0 ∈ R be an arbitrary preference relation on RL
+. We now deﬁne a
new preference relation for i, R∗
i, as follows. The upper contour set for R∗
i at



























As a convex hull, uc(q;R∗
i) is convex for all q ∈ C(zi), and as an intersection
of convex sets, uc(c;R∗
i) is convex for all c ∈ RL
+. This means that R∗
i is
convex. Clearly, it is also continuous and strictly monotonic, so that R∗
i ∈ R.
Moreover, R∗
i and Ri agree on RK


























i and R0 agree on RM











































































= uc(bi;R0) ∩ R
M
+ ,
Similarly, we construct R0∗


































for any c ∈ RL
+. The orderings R0∗
i and R0
i agree on RK
+,R 0∗








i. In particular, R∗
i and R0∗
i agree on RM











i >a i,a n dbi >b 00
i. By transitivity and strict monotonicity
of preferences, a00
i P∗
i zi and wi P∗
i b00
i for all i ∈ N. B yW e a kP a r e t o ,
a00 P∗ z and wP ∗ b00.S i n c ezPw , it follows from Independence of Irrelevant
Commodities (IIC) that zP ∗ w. By transitivity of R∗,w eh a v ea00 P∗ b00.




i. By transitivity and strict
monotonicity of preferences and Weak Pareto, z0 P0∗
i a00 and b00 P0∗
i w0.O n
the other hand, it follows from IIC and a00 P∗ b00 that a00 P0∗ b00.B yt r a n s i -
tivity of P0∗, z0 P0∗ w0. From IIC (applied to R0∗
N and R0
N), we have z0 P0 w0.
Recall that xP 0 z0 and w0 P0 y. By transitivity, xP 0 y.
We have shown that xPy⇒ xP 0 y.B y s y m m e t r y ,xP 0 y ⇒ xPy ,
and yPx⇔ yP 0 x. Hence, it also holds that xIy⇔ xI 0 y.
Second case: M(RN) ∩ M(R0
N)=∅. Let R00
N ∈ D− be such that
M(R00
N)∩M(RN) 6= ∅ and M(R00
N)∩M(R0
N) 6= ∅, a n ds u c ht h a tR00
N and RN
(and R0
N as well) agree on {x,y}. It is easy to ﬁnd such R00
N. For instance, if
22R00
i is linear for all i (that is, there is pi ∈ RL
++ such that xi Ri yi if and only if
pi.xi ≥ pi.yi), then M(R00





N). By the ﬁr s tc a s ea r g u m e n t ,R and R00
agree on {x,y}, and so do R0 and R00. Therefore R and R0 agree on {x,y}.
Let Y ⊆ X be given. An agent i0 ∈ N is called a quasi-dictator over Y
if for all RN ∈ D, all x,y ∈ Y, x P y whenever xi0 Pi0 yi0 and for no i ∈ N,
xi Ii yi. A pair of allocations {x,y} ⊆ X is called a trivial pair on D if there
is i ∈ N such that for all RN,R 0
N ∈ D, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y}. By strict
monotonicity of preferences, this happens when either x>yor x<y .A
set of three allocations {x,y,z} ⊆ X is called a free triple on D if for every
n-tuple of orderings ON on {x,y,z}, there exists RN ∈ D such that RN and
ON agree on {x,y,z}. Let RK ⊂ R be the subset of preferences Ri such that
K is suﬃcient for Ri.
Lemma 2 Let K ⊆ L. Let {x,y},{z,w} ⊂ X be non-trivial pairs on
(RK)
n . There exist v1,...,vm ∈ X such that
v
1 = x, v
2 = y, v
m−1 = z, v
m = w
and for all q =1 ,...,m− 2, {vq,vq+1,v q+2} is a free triple on (RK)
n .
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .Since {x,y} is a non-trivial pair, there is p ∈ RL
++ be





















¢n such that kx00 − x0k < ε,
ky00 − y0k < ε (where k.k denotes the Euclidean distance), and {x,y,u},
{v,x00,y00} a r ef r e et r i p l e sf o re v e r yu ∈ {x00,y 00} and v ∈ {x,y}. Similarly,




¢n such that {z,w,u}, {v,z00,w 00} a r ef r e et r i p l e s
for every u ∈ {z00,w 00} and v ∈ {z,w}.





Pick i ∈ N.Let ¯ p, ¯ p0 ∈ RL
++ be such that ¯ px00
i =¯ py00





























i À 0, there exists ¯ p00 ∈ RL
++ and q0
i,q00











i , ¯ p
00z
00




This construction can be made for every i ∈ N. One checks that {x00,y 00,u},
{z00,w 00,u} and {v,q0,q00} a r ef r e et r i p l e sf o re v e r yu ∈ {q0,q00} and v ∈
{x00,y00,z00,w 00}.
We can now connect {x,y},{z,w} by the following sequence of
free triples: {x,y,x00}, {y,x00,y00}, {x00,y00,q 0}, {y00,q0,q00}, {q0,q00,z00},
{q00,z00,w 00}, {z00,w 00,z}, {w00,z,w}.
Lemma 3 Let K ⊆ L. Let RN ∈ (RK)
n and x,y ∈ X be such that for no
i ∈ N, xi Ii yi.T h e n , t h e r e e x i s t s z ∈ X such that {x,z} and {z,y} are
non-trivial on (RK)
n and for all i ∈ N, either xi Pi zi Pi yi or yi Pi zi Pi xi.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 . Pick i ∈ N and assume, without loss of generality,
that xi Pi yi.
First case, xi >y i. Suppose, again without loss of generality, that xi1 >
yi1.
First subcase, yi1 > 0. One can ﬁnd ε,η ∈ R++ such that
zi =( yi1 − ε,x i2 + η,y i3,...,yi`)
satisﬁes xi Pi zi Pi yi.
Second subcase, yi1 =0and (without loss of generality) yi2 > 0. One can
ﬁnd ε,η ∈ R++ such that
zi =( xi1 + ε,y i2 − η,y i3,...,yi`)
satisﬁes xi Pi zi Pi yi.
Second case, xi ≯ yi. For λ ∈ (0,1), let
zi = λxi +( 1− λ)yi.
By convexity of preferences, for λ close enough to 0, one has xi Pi zi Pi yi.
Lemma 4 Let K ⊆ L. Suppose that for every triple {x,y,z} ⊂ X that is
free on (RK)
n, there is a quasi-dictator over {x,y,z}. Then there is a quasi-
dictator over X.
24P r o o fo fL e m m a4 . Pick any free triple {a,b,c} ⊂ X and let i0 be its
quasi-dictator. Let RN ∈ (RK)
n and x,y ∈ X be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 and
for no i ∈ N, xi Ii yi. By Lemma 3, there is z ∈ X such that {x,z} and
{z,y} are non-trivial on (RK)
n and for all i ∈ N, either xi Pi zi Pi yi or
yi Pi zi Pi xi. In particular, one has xi0 Pi0 zi0 Pi0 yi0.
By Lemma 2, there exist v1,...,vm ∈ X such that
v
1 = a, v
2 = b, v
m−1 = x, v
m = z
and for all q =1 ,...,m−2, {vq,vq+1,vq+2} is a free triple on (RK)
n . Similarly,
there exist w1,...,wt ∈ X such that
w
1 = a, w
2 = b, w
t−1 = y, w
t = z
and for all q =1 ,...,t − 2, {wq,w q+1,w q+2} is a free triple on (RK)
n .
Necessarily i0 is a quasi-dictator for all {vq,v q+1,vq+2}, for q =1 ,...,m−2,
as well as for all {wq,w q+1,w q+2}, for q =1 ,...,t − 2. This implies that i0 is
a quasi-dictator over {x,z} and over {z,y}. Therefore, xPzand zPy .By
transitivity, xPy .
Lemma 5 Let K ⊆ L. On the domain (RK)
n , if a SOF satisﬁes Weak
Pareto and Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, then for every free
triple {x,y,z} ⊆ X, there exists a quasi-dictator over {x,y,z}.
Proof of Lemma 5. This is a direct application of the variant of Arrow’s
theorem which considers the case of strict preferences (no indiﬀerence).
Lemma 6 Let K ⊆ L. On the domain (RK)
n , if i0 ∈ N is a quasi-dictator
over X, then i0 is a dictator over X.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 .Let x,y ∈ X and RN ∈ (RK)
n be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0.
By continuity and strict monotonicity of preferences, there exists z ∈ X such
that xi0 Pi0 zi0 Pi0 yi0 and for all i ∈ N, either xi Pi zi Pi yi or yi Ri xi Pi zi.
It follows that xPz(by Weak Pareto)and zPy(because i0 is a quasi-
dictator). By transitivity, xPy .
Lemma 7 On the domain D−, if a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Weak
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, then there exists a dictator over X.
25Proof of Lemma 7. D− =
S
KÃL (RK)
n . By Lemmas 4, 5 and 6, we
know that there is a dictator iK over X for every domain (RK)
n . Let
x,y ∈ X, K,K0 ⊂ L and RN ∈
T
KÃL (RK)
n be such that xiK PiK yiK and
yiK0 PiK0 xiK0. O n em u s th a v exPyand yPx ,an impossibility. Therefore
t h es a m ea g e n tm u s tb et h ed i c t a t o rf o ra l lK.
The ﬁrst part of the theorem is a direct consequence of Lemmas 1 and 7.






+ | ∀yi ∈ R
L\{k}
+ ,x i Pi yi
o
i(k)={i ∈ N | xi(k) 6= ∅},
K(i)={k ∈ L | i ∈ i(k)}.
Since RN ∈ D+,i (k) 6= ∅ for all k ∈ L and
S
i∈N K(i)=L. Let us also prove
that for any i ∈ N and k ∈ L, the set xi(k) is closed and is equal to uc(xi;Ri)
for some xi ∈ RL
+. Take any sequence (zt
i)t∈N in xi(k) which converges to
some zi ∈ RL
+. Assume that there is yi ∈ R
L\{k}
+ such that yi Ri zi. Then,
by strict monotonicity of preferences, there is y0
i ∈ R
L\{k}
+ such that y0
i Pi zi.
By continuity of preferences, there is t ∈ N such that y0
i Pi zt
i, contradicting
t h ef a c tt h a tzt
i ∈ xi(k). This proves that xi(k) is closed. Moreover, for any
zi,z0
i ∈ RL
+ such that z0
i ∈ xi(k) and zi Ri z0
i, one has zi ∈ xi(k). Take any
zi ∈ xi(k) and let
xi =m i n{α ∈ R+ | αzi ∈ xi(k)}zi.
By construction, xi ∈ xi(k) and for any x0
i ∈ RL
+ such that x0
i Ri xi,x 0
i ∈ xi(k);
conversely, for any x0
i ∈ xi(k),x 0
i Ri xi. Otherwise, if xi Pi x0
i, there is
exists α0 < min{α ∈ R+ | αzi ∈ xi(k)} such that α0zi Pi x0
i, implying that






xi(k) if i ∈ i(k)
RL








By construction, for every i there is xi ∈ RL
+ such that uci = uc(xi;Ri).
As a consequence, for all allocations x ∈
Q
i∈N uci and y/ ∈
Q
i∈N uci, there is
i such that xi Ri xi Pi yi, implying that y does not Pareto-dominate x.
26When K(i) 6= ∅ and xi ∈ uci, then for all k ∈ K(i),x i ∈ uck
i = xi(k).
Therefore for all yi ∈ R
L\{k}
+ ,x i Pi yi, so that necessarily xi / ∈ R
L\{k}
+ . In
summary, one has xik > 0 for any xi ∈ uci and k ∈ K(i). Since
S
i∈N K(i)=
L,o n et h e nh a s
P
i∈N xi À 0 whenever xi ∈ uci for all i ∈ N. Therefore, for




We can now deﬁne the social ordering Ψ(RN) as follows. Choose a ref-
erence bundle x0 ∈ RL











min{λ ∈ R+ | λx0 Ri xi} ≥ min
i
min{λ ∈ R+ | λx0 Ri yi};
(ii) x ∈
Q
i∈N uci and y/ ∈
Q
i∈N uci;
(iii) x,y / ∈
Q
i∈N uci and x1 R1 y1.
For any RN this social ordering is transitive because it partitions the set
(RL
+)n in two subsets,
Q
i∈N uci and its complement, ranks all allocations
in
Q
i∈N uci above the others, and espouses transitive rankings within each
subset. Weak Pareto is satisﬁed because no allocation from the complement
of
Q
i∈N uci can Pareto-dominate an allocation in
Q
i∈N uci, and also because
the speciﬁcr a n k i n g sf o r
Q
i∈N uci and its complement satisfy Weak Pareto.
Independence of Irrelevant Commodities is satisﬁed because when x,y ∈
(RK
+)n for K Ã L, necessarily x,y / ∈
Q
i∈N uci, so that when RN and R0
N
agree on RK
+, obviously R1 and R0
1 agree on {x,y}, and the social ordering
as well.
Remark. The impossibility result no longer holds if the set R is ex-
tended to include non strictly monotonic preferences. Let A(RN)=
{x ∈ X | ∀i ∈ N, xi Pi 0} and B(RN)={x ∈ X | ∃i ∈ N, xi Ii 0}. Consider
the following SOF R. It is such that xRywhenever one of the conditions
below holds:
(i) x ∈ A(RN) and y ∈ B(RN);
(ii) x,y ∈ A(RN) and x1 R1 y1;
(iii) x,y ∈ B(RN) and x2 R2 y2.
This SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and IIC, but is not dictatorial. However,
this example obviously displays clear dictatorial features, and the essence
of our results does not really depend on strict monotonicity of preferences.
27In particular on the subdomain of D− (extended to non-strictly monotonic
preferences) such that for every i, every xi > 0,x i Pi 0, the dictatorship
result is preserved.
Proof of Theorem 3: For the impossibility, the only part of the proof of
Th. 2 which needs to be changed is the proof of Lemma 1, which is now
reformulated as follows.
Lemma 8 If a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Individualistic Independence
of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satisﬁes Weak Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives.
P r o o fo fL e m m a8 .Let RN,R 0
N ∈ D−∗ and x,y ∈ X be such that for all
i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y},a n df o rn oi ∈ N, xi Ii yi. Assume that
xPy .F o ra n yRi, let M(Ri) be the set of non-empty subsets of commodities
which are dispensable for Ri:
M(Ri)={K ⊆ L | K 6= ∅ and K is dispensable for Ri}.
Let R00
N be such that for all i, M(R00
i)=L\{L} (for instance, this is obtained
with linear preferences) and Ri and R00
i agree on {x,y}.
Let i ∈ N be given. Since RN ∈ D−∗, M(Ri) 6= ∅. Choose some non-
empty Mi ∈ M(Ri) and deﬁne Ki := L\Mi.S i n c ex,y > 0, by monotonicity
of preferences we know that yi Pi 0 and xi P00






(i) if xi Pi yi (and hence xi P0







(ii) if yi Pi xi (and hence yi P0







(iii) there is λi,λ
0












(i) if xi Pi yi,t h e na0
i >a 00
i >a i >b i >b 00
i >b 0
i,a n d




i >a i.a n d
(iii) there is µi,µ 0




Let R0 ∈ R be an arbitrary preference relation on RL
+. By the same way












i ai and wi I∗
i bi.
Similarly, we construct R00∗
i ∈ R such that:
(i) R00∗
i and R00
















i agree on R
Mi
+ because they both agree with R0.





















n ).B y c o n -
struction (see the proof of Lemma 1), R∗
N,R 00∗
N ∈ D−∗.
By Weak Pareto, we have zPxand yPw . By our supposition, xPy .
Hence, transitivity of P implies zPw . On the other hand, for every i ∈
N, since a00
i >a i,b i >b 00
i,z i I∗
i ai and wi I∗
i bi, strict monotonicity and
transitivity of preferences imply a00
i P∗
i zi and wi P∗
i b00
i. By Weak Pareto,
a00 P∗ z and wP ∗ b00. It follows from zPwand Individualistic Independence
of Irrelevant Commodities (IIIC) that zP ∗ w. By transitivity of R∗,w eh a v e
a00 P∗ b00.
Similarly, by Weak Pareto, xP 00 z0 and w0 P00 y. By transitivity and
strict monotonicity of preferences and Weak Pareto, we have z0 P00∗ a00 and
b00 P00∗ w0. On the other hand, it follows from a00 P∗ b00 and IIIC that
a00 P00∗ b00. By transitivity of P00∗, z0 P00∗ w0. From IIIC (applied to R00∗
N and
R00
N), we have z0 P00 w0. By transitivity, xP 00 y.
We have shown that xPy⇒ xP 00 y.B ys y m m e t r y ,xP 00 y ⇒ xPy ,
and yPx⇔ yP 00 x. Hence, it also holds that xIy⇔ xI 00 y. This means
that R and R00 agree on {x,y}.
By a similar reasoning, we can prove that R0 and R00 agree on {x,y}.
Therefore R and R0 agree on {x,y}.
For the second part of Th. 3, let RN ∈ D+∗. Choose any i0 ∈ N such
that every K ⊆ L is essential for Ri0. We deﬁne the social ordering Ψ(RN) as




¢n ,xRyif one of the following conditions holds:
(i) xi0,y i0 ∈ uci0 and x2 R2 y2;
(ii) xi0 ∈ uci0 and yi0 / ∈ uci0;
(iii) xi0,y i0 / ∈ uci0 and x1 R1 y1.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m4 :
The proof relies on the following lemmas.
29Lemma 9 Let K Ã L, K 6= ∅. On the domain Rn, if a SOF satisﬁes
Weak Pareto and Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satis-










¢n and RN,R 0
N ∈ Rn be such
that for all i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y} and for no i ∈ N, xi Ii yi. Let
M = L \ K. Suppose xPy .
By a similar method as in the proof of Lemma 1, one constructs R∗
N,R 0∗
N ∈
Rn and a,a0,a 00,b,b 0,b 00 ∈ RM
+ \{ 0} such that for all i ∈ N:
(i) if xi Pi yi then a0
i >a 00
i >a i >b i >b 00
i >b 0
i;





(iii) Ri and R∗








i agree on RM
+ ;
(vi) xi I∗




i and yi I0∗
i b0
i.
By Weak Pareto, a00 P∗ x and yP ∗ b00. By IIC, xP ∗ y so that a00 P∗ b00.
By IIC again, a00 P0∗ b00. By Weak Pareto, xP 0∗ a00 and b00 P0∗ y so that
xP 0∗ y. By IIC, xP 0 y. As in Lemma 1, one then easily deduces that R and
R0 agree on {x,y}.
Lemma 10 Let K Ã L, with cardinal |K| > 1. On the domain Rn,i fa
SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alterna-








This is proved like the sequence of Lemmas 4, 5 and 6.
Lemma 11 Let K Ã L, |K| =1 . On the domain Rn, if a SOF satisﬁes
















¢n such that for every i ∈ N, xi ≷ yi if and only
if zi ≷ wi and for no i ∈ N, xi = yi.





be such that for
every i ∈ N, xi ≷ yi if and only if ai ≷ bi. Suppose xPy .One can
30construct RN ∈ Rn such that for every i ∈ N, either ai Pi xi Pi yi Pi bi or
yi Pi bi Pi ai Pi xi. By Weak Pareto, aPxand yPb ,so that by transitivity,
aPb .By IIC and monotonicity of preferences, this ranking does not depend





and |K0| =1 . By a similar
reasoning, therefore, one shows that aPbimplies zPw .Similarly, if yPx ,
one proves that wPz .In summary, xPyif and only if zPw ,and yRxif
and only if wRz .Let us call this property “neutrality”.
The rest of the proof mimics part of the proof of Arrow’s theorem (see,
e.g., Sen 1970, ch. 3*). We present it for completeness. Take any G ⊆ N such




¢n ,xPyif xi >y i for all i ∈ G.( T h i sp r o p e r t y
holds for G = N by Weak Pareto.) Partition G into non-empty subsets G1




¢n be such that xi >y i for all i ∈ N \ G2 and




¢n such that xi >y i >z i for
all i ∈ G1,x i <z i <y i for all i ∈ G2 and zi >x i >y i for all i ∈ N \ G. One
has yPzbecause yi >z i for all i ∈ G.N o w ,e i t h e rxPzor zRx .In the





whenever ai >b i for all i ∈ G1 and ai <b i for all i ∈ N \ G1. In the latter,





whenever ai >b i for all i ∈ G2 and ai <b i for all i ∈ N \ G2.




¢n be such that ai >b i




¢n such that ai >c i >b i for all i ∈ G1 and
ci > max{ai,b i} for all i ∈ N \G1. Since ai >c i for all i ∈ G1 and ci >a i for
all i ∈ N \ G1, aPca n db yW e a kP a r e t o ,cPb ,implying aPb .Therefore,




¢n ,aPbwhenever ai >b i for all i ∈ G1.
Repeating this argument, one ultimately ﬁnds a subset containing a single




¢n ,aPbwhenever ai0 >b i0.
That is the dictator.
Lemma 12 On the domain Rn,i faS O Fs a t i s ﬁes Weak Pareto and for all




¢n , then there is a dictator
over X.














Let K00 Ã L be such that K ∩ K00 6= ∅

























, implying i1 = i3. Similarly i2 = i3, so that i1 = i2.
This proves that there is only one dictator i0.
Case 2: ` =2 . By Lemma 11, there is a dictator i1 over (R++ ×{ 0})
n.
Let x,y ∈ ({0}×R++)
n be such that xi1 >y i1. Then, there exist z,w ∈
(R++ ×{ 0})
n such that for all i ∈ N, (i) if xi >y i,t h e nzi >w i, and (ii)
if xi ≤ yi,t h e nzi <w i. One can construct R0
N ∈ Rn such that for all
i ∈ N,e i t h e rxi Pi zi Pi wi Pi yi or wi Pi yi Ri xi Pi zi. In particular,
zi Pi1 wi.S i n c ei1 is a dictator over (R++ ×{ 0})
n, one has zPw .B yW e a k
Pareto, xPzand wPy . By transitivity, xPy . By IIC and monotonicity
of preferences, this ranking does not depend on individual preferences since
x,y ∈ ({0}×R++)
n.T h i sm e a n st h a ti1 is a dictator over ({0}×R++)
n as
well.
Next, let x,y ∈ X and RN ∈ Rn be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0. Let K,K0 be















be such that xi0 Pi0 zi0 Pi0 yi0 and for all i 6= i0,x i Pi zi






,zPy ,while xPzby Weak Pareto. Therefore
xPyby transitivity.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :
T h ep r o o fh a se x a c t l yt h es a m es t r u c t u r ea si nt h eﬁrst part.
Lemma 13 On the domain Rn, if a SOF satisﬁes Weak Pareto and Indi-
vidualistic Independence of Irrelevant Commodities, then it satisﬁes Weak
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives restricted to allocations in X.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 3 :Let RN,R 0
N ∈ Rn and x,y ∈ X be such that for all
i ∈ N, Ri and R0
i agree on {x,y},a n df o rn oi ∈ N, xi Ii yi. Assume that
xPy .
For every i ∈ N, if xi Pi yi then let Ki = {k ∈ L | xik > 0} and if yi Pi xi
then let Ki = {k ∈ L | yik > 0}. Let Mi = L \ Ki. Since x,y ∈ X, we know
that Ki,M i 6= ∅.
Since xi,y i > 0, by monotonicity of preferences we know that yi Pi 0
and xi P0




+ such that for all
i ∈ N,
(i) if xi Pi yi (and hence xi P0







32(ii) if yi Pi xi (and hence yi P0







(iii) there is λi,λ
0









+ such that for all i ∈ N,
(i) if xi Pi yi,t h e na0
i >a 00
i >a i >b i >b 00
i >b 0
i,




i >a i,a n d
(iii) there is µi,µ 0




The rest is as in the proof of Lemma 8.
The rest of the proof applies without change for the case ` ≥ 3. When
there are only two commodities, a more direct proof is necessary, because
there are no free triples. Indeed, in this case, in X any individual bundle has
only one commodity in positive quantity, so that for any triple of bundles,
there are at least two bundles with the same commodity. Strictly monotonic
preferences rank this pair of bundles according to their respective quantity
for this commodity.
Here is a proof for ` =2 . By Lemmas 11 and 12 and the fact that IIIC
implies IIC, there is a dictator i0 over X =( R++ ×{ 0})
n ∪ ({0}×R++)
n.
Let x,y ∈ X and RN ∈ Rn be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0 and for all i ∈ N,
xi.yi > 0 (meaning that the two bundles have a positive quantity for the
same commodity). One can construct z,w ∈ X and R0
N ∈ Rn such that
for every i ∈ N, either xi Pi yi and xi P0
i zi P0
i wi P0




i zi. By dictatorship, zP 0 w a n db yW e a kP a r e t o ,xP 0 z and
wP 0 y. By transitivity, xP 0 y and by IIIC and monotonicity of preferences,
xPy .
Let x,y ∈ X and RN ∈ Rn be such that xi0 Pi0 yi0. One can construct
z ∈ X such that for every i ∈ N, yi.zi > 0 and either xi Pi zi Pi yi or
yi Ri xi Pi zi. By the above property, one has zPy .By Weak Pareto, xPz ,
implying xPy .This shows that i0 is a dictator over X.
33